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2Abstract
Wemotivate and present a definition of an embodied, grounded
individual sensorimotor interaction history, that captures the
time-extended behaviour characteristic of humans and many an-
imals. We present an architecture that connects temporally ex-
tended individual experience with capacity for action, whereby a
robot can develop over ontogeny through interaction. Central is
an information theoretic metric space of sensorimotor experience
that is dynamically constructed and reconstructed as the robot
acts. We present results of robotic experiments that establish
the predictive efficacy of the space and show the robot develop-
ing the capacity to play the simple interaction game “peekaboo”.
A quantitative investigation of the appropriate horizon length of
experience for the game reveals the relationship between length
of experience and cycle time of interaction, and suggests the im-
portance of multiple, and possibly self-adaptive, horizon lengths.
Keywords: Interaction History, Sensorimotor Experience, Information The-
ory, Peekaboo, Ontogenetic Development
3Introduction
A challenge of research into embodied cognition in robots is to reach beyond
reactive architectures to systems that exhibit the time-extended behaviour
characteristic of humans and many animals. We are interested in how cog-
nitive structures in natural and artificial systems can arise that capture the
history of interactions and behaviours of an agent actively engaged in its
environment, without resorting to ungrounded symbolic representations of
past events. Our goal is to design and test such an architecture for a robotic
agent, addressing the problem of broadening the temporal horizon to gen-
erate adaptive behaviour, while not necessarily trying to to model details
of human behaviour. The ultimate aim of the work is to achieve scafolded
ontogeny in robots and other artificial agents by endowing them with an
extended temporal horizon grounded in their own sensorimotor interaction
histories. In this work we lay the theoretical and experimental groundwork
for one attempt of achieving this.
We introduce an architecture for ontogeny and adaptive action based on
a metric space of temporally extended sensorimotor experience. The robot
chooses how to behave in the world based on what it has experienced. This
results in further experience modifying the space of experience establishing
a tight coupling of experience and action.
In Section 1 and 2 we establish a theoretical basis for our particular
view of an interaction history, including the information theoretical aspects,
ending by presenting a computational robotic model. Related research is
discussed in Section 3. A simple experiment is presented in Section 4 that
demonstrates the efficacy of the space generated by the robot passively ex-
periencing its environment. The architecture is then used by a robot to
develop the capacity to engage in “peekaboo”, a simple early interaction
game (Section 5) . We conclude with a discussion of the experimental re-
sults, current strengths and limitations of the model, and suggestions for
future work.
1 Interaction Histories
We start by considering how memory is viewed from an embodied perspec-
tive and why temporal extension is important. We then draw on this motiva-
tion to present a suitable definition of interaction history which can become
the basis for our robotic model.
1.1 Temporal Horizon and Extension
The temporal horizon of an agent delimits the history (whether personal or
socially acquired) that an agent has access to (Nehaniv, Polani, Dauten-
hahn, te Boekhorst, and Can˜amero, 2002). Autonomous embodied artificial
4agents that make use of interaction histories in guiding their actions can be
thought of as extending their temporal horizon beyond that of a simple re-
active agent (for instance Braitenberg Vehicles (Braitenberg, 1984)). These
agents become post-reactive systems when acting with respect to a broad
temporal horizon by making use of temporally extended episodes in inter-
action dynamics (Nehaniv et al., 2002). Internal state as used in affective
agents can also extend the temporal scope of the agent (potentially indef-
initely but usually for the short or medium term), as previous interactions
can affect later actions through the agents’ affective state. However, in gen-
eral this approach does not allow for access to episodic historical events and
so cannot, for instance, suggest more complex alternative courses of action
(Scheult and Logan, 2001).
We note that the temporal horizon for an agent potentially encompasses
the entire past history of the agent (although it can be focused on episodes
of horizon of arbitrary size). History may inform forward temporal exten-
sion in, for example, prediction, anticipation and planning. The size of the
temporal horizon influencing behaviour can be varied and does vary between
natural agents. Some agents, it seems, live only in the present, for instance
Braitenberg Vehicles1 and probably bacteria2.
Research in developmental psychology of human infants points to the
importance of anticipation and prediction in the development of cognitive
capabilities (see, for example, von Hofsten (1993)). A traditional artificial
intelligence approach to achieving this might be to build an internal model of
the process or task in question, and then to use that model to predict future
states. However, we argue that by using a temporally extended history as
the basis for action, links between experiences and actions may be built that
allow the agent to act such that it exhibits the appearance prospection of
repeated and familiar events in its environment.
1.2 Dynamic Systems, Cognition and Memory
Cognitive systems can be viewed as the structure and processing of dynam-
ical systems operating in various kinds of state spaces (agent-environment,
sensorimotor, perception-action etc.) (Thelen and Smith, 1994, Kelso, 1995,
Dautenhahn and Christaller, 1996). Regions and attractors (or structures)
of these dynamical systems may reflect interesting areas in terms of remem-
bering and adaptive action. These structures are created through interplay
of the dynamic system and the agent interaction with the environment.
From an action oriented viewpoint, an agent’s interaction with the envi-
ronment can construct the structures that are used for remembering how to
act. Furthermore, the process of remembering and acting may alter those
structures thus reconstructing the “memory”. This may involve altering the
detail of the original structures, changing the relative importance of them
or, in terms of dynamical systems, moving and altering the attractors. We
5will refer to this process as dynamical construction. To illustrate, consider
auto-associative Hopfield artificial neural networks (Gurney, 1997). The
dynamics of such networks resolve to particular attractors (memories) on
presentation of particular inputs. Learning of new memories affects what is
already stored, and if the network were able to learn while recalling, recall
would also modify “stored” memories. Thus, memory consists not of static
representations of the past that can be recalled with perfect clarity, but
rather is the result of a dynamic accretion of interaction with the environ-
ment.
1.3 Remembering, Memory and Action
We follow the argumentation of Rosenfield (1988) (for a review see (Clancey,
1991)) and Dautenhahn and Christaller (1996) in relation to situated cog-
nition, that human and animal memory is the result of an accumulation of
interaction with the environment. Furthermore, the way that memory mani-
fests itself is as embodied action. That is, it is in actions resulting from recall
that we witness memory and that recall itself is dependent on embodiment.
This argument has support in the view that the purpose of perception and
memory for the natural environment is to guide action (Glenberg, 1997) and
that even abstract concepts can be interpreted in terms of physical actions
and properties.
Glenberg (1997), Clancey (1997), Pfeifer and Scheier (1999), among oth-
ers3 also argue for an embodied situated memory and memory as recatego-
rization. The emphasis is on the interaction with the environment and a
process view of memory.
An important aspect of interaction history is that it is constructed from
the perspective of the individual, that is, it is autobiographical in nature.
Dautenhahn (1996) defines an autobiographical agent, as “an embodied agent
that dynamically reconstructs its individual history (autobiography) during
its lifetime”.
In terms of the accepted separation of memory types due to Tulving
(1983), interaction histories could be classified as episodic memory as op-
posed to semantic memory. That is, it is the memory of events (with a
temporal aspect and, usually, a personal aspect), rather than the memory
of knowledge and categories. Interaction histories though have elements of
both. Categories and knowledge may emerge from many overlapping expe-
riences aided by the process of dynamic construction, while certain unique
events may still stand out and give memory its episodic nature. This is a
view supported by Glenberg (1997).
An autobiographic agent may also be able to communicate significant
episodes in its past to other agents which could further increase the temporal
horizon of the agent and that of others (Nehaniv, 1999). Here the notion
of recounting, or communication of that history is important particularly in
6social agents.
While we do not claim that an interaction history can describe all aspects
of (human) memory, we believe that exploring its features may give insights
into the nature of memory in adaptive behaviour as a whole.
1.4 Ontogenetic Development
Ontogenetic development in artificial and natural organisms can be seen
as an incremental, possibly open-ended, self-organising process of change
where an organism refines its current capabilities by using internally gener-
ated drives and motivations and exploration of its environment and embodi-
ment to generate new goals, capabilities and behaviours (Lungarella, Metta,
Pfeifer, and Sandini, 2003).
We hypothesize that a dynamically constructed history of interactions
that is used to generate and select actions in an embodied agent, can serve
to scaffold the ontogenetic development of the agent. Development in this
case can be seen as the increasing richness of the connections of experience
with action, mediated by suitable mechanisms. Such a history can facilitate
incremental development at the borders of experience. It is known that
this is the case for human development which is continually scaffolded by
building new capabilities on top of existing ones. Learning proceeds at
the periphery of known experience and already mastered interaction skills
enabling development (“zone of proximal development”) (Vygotsky, 1978).
The development process though, depends on drives and motivation.
Classical conditioning and two-process reinforcement learning based on pos-
itive and negative reinforcers, e.g. (Rolls, 1999), are potential mechanisms
for connecting previous experience with choice of action. In this study an in-
ternally generated motivation system (see Appendix A) is used that assigns
reinforcement values to an episode of experience.
1.5 Definition of an Interaction History
In view of the preceding discussion and motivated by a dynamical systems,
embodied view of memory, we propose the following definition of an inter-
action history as being:
the temporally extended, dynamically constructed, individual sen-
sorimotor history of an agent situated and acting in its environ-
ment including the social environment, that shapes current and
future action.
The key aspects of this definition are:
• Temporal extension: The overall horizon of an agent’s experience ex-
tends into the past (potentially including all previous experience avail-
7able to the agent) and also into the future in terms of prediction,
anticipation and expectation.
• Dynamical construction: This indicates that the history is continually
being both constructed and reconstructed, with previous experiences
being modified in this process, and potentially affecting how new ex-
periences are assimilated.
• Grounding : The history need not be symbolic (i.e. recorded in terms of
externally imposed representations) and is grounded in the sensorimo-
tor experience of the agent. Beyond innate structures for perception,
any new representations and categories may emerge in cognitive struc-
tures as a result of the agent-environment interaction.
• Remembering in action: The process of remembering drives and shapes
the choice of current and future action, while dynamically re-shaping
the structures employed in remembering.
Note that we use the term interaction to indicate that this temporally ex-
tended history encompasses the sensorimotor history, the history of action as
well as the feedback of action on the history. This definition encompasses all
kinds of interaction with the environment, but specifically includes the so-
cial environment. It differs from simple reinforcement or neural net learning
in explicitly incorporating the temporally extended nature of experience.
2 An Interaction History Architecture
Figure 1 shows an architecture that demonstrates how histories of sensori-
motor experiences can be explicitly integrated into the control of a robot.
Our approach is to continually gather sensorimotor data and find episodes
of sensorimotor experience in the history near to the current episode and,
depending on the course of subsequent experience, choose from among ac-
tions that were executed when these episodes were previously encountered,
or possibly other actions.
Figure 1 about here
There are two key aspects of this architecture. The first is the metric
space of experience whereby new experiences appear as points in a growing
and changing metric space. The second is the action selection system. This
closes the perception-action loop and also closes an internal loop feeding back
and modifying the experience space. A quality measure, as determined by
the agent’s motivation and drives, is conferred onto each experience and that
along with proximity in the metric space is used to distinguish experiences
and select action. We describe these two aspects in the following sections.
82.1 Metric Space of Experience
Central to the proposed architecture is the capability to make metric com-
parisons between episodes of sensorimotor experience. An advantage of con-
sidering episodes is that they potentially hold more information about recent
interactions than does current sensorimotor state by itself.
One approach is to look for regularities in the statistical and informa-
tional structure of the data. Informational and statistical structure of sen-
sorimotor data can also be used to characterize or “fingerprint” behaviour
(te Boekhorst, Lungarella, and Pfeifer, 2003, Tarapore, Lungarella, and
Go´mez, 2004) and also for a robot to classify its own behaviour on-line us-
ing trajectories in sensor-motor spaces constructed from metric measures of
distances between sensors (Mirza, Nehaniv, Dautenhahn, and te Boekhorst,
2005b, Kaplan and Hafner, 2005).
In the following sections we describe the application of Shannon infor-
mation theory (Shannon, 1948) to compare episodes of sensorimotor expe-
rience (see also (Mirza, Nehaniv, Dautenhahn, and te Boekhorst, 2005a,
Nehaniv, 2005)). The basis is the information metric (Crutchfield, 1990), a
measure of the distance, in terms of bits of Shannon information, between
two information sources. We use the measure to compare sensorimotor ex-
perience over time and across modalities. Moreover, we close the loop to
adaptive behaviour by allowing the agent to act based on remembering its
previous experiences this space of its own temporally extended sensorimotor
experiences. Here the notion of “temporally extended experience” will be
operationalized in a rigorous way using the flow of values over the agent’s
sensorimotor variables during a particular interval of time (temporal hori-
zon).
2.1.1 Sensors as Information Sources
An agent situated and acting in an environment will have many external and
internal sensory inputs any of which can be modelled as random variables
changing over time. Consider one such random variable X changing with
time, taking values x(t) ∈ X, where X is the set of its possible values. Time
is taken to be discrete (i.e. t will denote a natural number) and X takes
values in a finite set or “alphabet” X = {x1, . . . , xm} of possible values4.
Furthermore, any sensor or motor variable X , beginning from a particu-
lar moment in time t0 until a later moment t0+h (h > 0), with the sequence
of values x(t0), x(t0 + 1), . . . , x(t0 + h − 1) can be considered as the time-
series data from a new random variable Xt0,h, the sensorimotor variable with
temporal horizon h starting at time t0
92.1.2 Information Distance
For any pair of jointly distributed random variables (sensors) X and Y the
conditional entropy H(X|Y) of X given Y is the amount of uncertainty that
remains about the value X given that the value of Y is known, and is given
by:
H(X|Y) = −
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x, y) log2
p(x, y)
p(y)
,
where p(x, y) is given by the joint distribution of X and Y.
We assume approximate local stationarity of the joint distribution of
random variables representing the sensorimotor variables over a temporal
window and that this can be estimated closely enough by sampling the
sensorimotor variables.
The information distance between X and Y is then given by
d(X ,Y) = H(X|Y) +H(Y|X ).
Crutchfield (1990) shows that this satisfies the mathematical axioms of
equivalence, symmetry and the triangle inequality and so is ametric. Specif-
ically, for three information sources X , Y and Z, d is a metric if it satisfies
the following:
1. d(X ,Y) = 0 if and only if X and Y are equivalent.
2. d(X ,Y) = d(Y,X ) (symmetry)
3. d(X ,Y) + d(Y,Z) ≥ d(X ,Z) (triangle inequality).
Thus d defines a geometric structure on any space of jointly distributed
information sources.
Given two sensorimotor variables Xt0,h and Yt1,h over a temporal horizon
of window size h, we can estimate the information distance d(Xt0,h,Yt1,h)
by measuring the frequencies of occurrence of values (xt0+i, yt1+i) as i runs
from 0 to h− 1.
With t0 = t1, d(X ,Y) gives the information distance between different
variables at the same time t. With X and Y taken from the same senso-
rimotor variable at different times, d(X ,Y) gives the information distance
between time-shifted regions of the variable.
Clearly there are issues related to the size of the temporal horizon h and
also the number of values (bins) X and Y may take that affect the accuracy of
these estimates. These issues are examined in (Mirza et al., 2005a) showing
that behaviour can be categorized robustly over a wide range of numbers of
bins and horizon lengths.
2.1.3 Experience and the Experience Metric
Given the above definitions we can now formalize an agent’s experience
from time t over a temporal horizon h as E(t, h) = (X 1t,h, . . . ,XNt,h) where
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X 1, . . . ,XN is the set of all sensorimotor variables available to the agent.
We can then define a metric on experiences of temporal horizon h as
D(E,E′) =
N∑
k=1
d(X kt,h,X kt′,h),
where E = E(t, h) and E′ = E(t′, h) are experiences of an agent at time t
and t′ over horizon h and d is the information distance. That D is a metric
follows from the fact that the metric axioms hold component-wise, since d
is a metric.
As experiences are collected, they can be placed in a metric space of
experience using the experience metric. The maximum dimensionality of
the space is N − 1, where N is the number of experiences in the space.
2.2 Action Selection
A simple mechanism is adopted for action selection whereby the robot can
execute one of a number of “atomic” actions (or no action) at any timestep.
This is seen as a tractable first-step, and a more sophisticated action or
behaviour generation capability would allow for more open-ended develop-
ment.
The actual action selected will either be a random selection of one of the
atomic actions, or will be an action that was previously executed after an
experience in the history that is near to the current episode. An advantage
of this approach is that behaviour can be bootstrapped from early random
activity, and later behaviour built on previous experience.
The process of action selection is as follows:
1. Up to K candidate experiences from the experience space within a
given information distance radius5 r0 of the current experience Ecurrent
are initially selected.
2. These K experiences are ranked as E1, . . . , EK according to how close
they are to Ecurrent.
3. Then, sequentially, experience Ei is chosen with probability a linear
function of the quality of Ei until either an experience is chosen or the
ranked list is exhausted.
4. If an experience is chosen from the candidate list, then the particular
action that was executed following the chosen experience is then chosen
as the action to be executed next, otherwise a random action is chosen.
The exact nature of the calculation of quality is dependent on the nature
of the intrinsic drives and motivations ascribed to the agent. For the ex-
perimental scenarios used in this paper, a specific motivational system was
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designed (see Appendix A). however, we note that this could altered and
generalized for other kinds of interaction.
The linear mapping from quality to probability ensures that, with small
probability, the robot may still choose a random action as this may poten-
tially help to discover new, more salient experiences. This has the advantage
of emulating body-babbling, i.e. apparently random body movements that
have the (hypothesized) purpose of learning the capabilities of the body in
an environment (Meltzoff and Moore, 1997). Early in development, there
are fewer, more widely spread experiences in the space, so random actions
would be chosen more often. Later in development, it is more likely that an
the action selected will come from past experience.
Finally, a feedback process evaluates the result of any action taken in
terms of whether there was an increase in quality after the action was exe-
cuted, and then adjusts the quality of the candidate experience, from which
the action was derived, up or down accordingly. By this mechanism, the met-
ric space is effectively altered from the point of view of the action-selection
system. Closing of the perception-action loop in this way with feedback
together with growth of the experiential metric space, results in the con-
struction of modified behaviour patterns over time. This can be viewed as a
form of ontogenetic development and adaptation, that is a process of change
in structure and skills through embodied, structurally coupled interaction.
2.3 Implementation
The Interaction History Architecture was implemented using using URBI
(Baillie, 2005) and Java on a Sony Aibo ERS-7 robot dog and a personal
computer running the Linux operating system. URBI provides the robot
control layer and a full-featured event based parallel scripting system. The
URBI software runs directly on the robot where actions and background
behaviours are executed, URBI receives and processes events and controls
motors every 35ms. The system runs on-line with telemetry data and video
images being sent over wireless to the personal computer approximately
every 80-120ms where the metric space of experience is constructed and
used in action selection. We define a timestep upon reception of each set of
data, so the time between timesteps varies and is approximately 80-120m.
The sensory information available to the robot falls into three broad cate-
gories: proprioceptive (from motor positions), exterioceptive (environmental
sensors, including vision) and internal (these might, for instance, indicate
drives and motivations, or be the result of processing of raw sensory data e.g.
ball position). Vision sensors are built by subdividing the visual field into re-
gions and taking average colour values over each region at each timestep. In
this implementation a 3x3 grid over the image is used taking the average of
the red channel only, resulting in 9 sensors for vision. A generalized human
face detection system, required for the interaction experiments of Section
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5 was implemented using Intel OpenCV HAAR Cascades (OpenCV, 2000),
smoothed to remove short gaps (< 50ms) in detection. The variables used
in this implementation are summarized in (Table 1), with further discussion
of internal variables in Appendix A. Note that audio is not used in these
experiments.
Table 1 about here
The basic object of data in the architecture is an “experience”. For
every experience the quantized values of all sensors over the time horizon h
are required to determine the information distance between the experience
and any other one, and so are stored. Additionally, the quality value of the
experience as determined by the motivational system detailed in Appendix A
is stored with each experience, subject to modification in interaction as
described in Section 2.2.
The horizon length h of the experiences used to construct the metric
space and the number of bins Q used to quantize sensor data are parameters
set for each particular experiment. Experiences are taken from the sensori-
motor data stream every G timesteps where G is the experience granularity.
Thus, a granularity of G = 2 would store an experience of h timesteps at
every other timestep.
The metric space is continually being updated as new experiences are
added by calculating the experience distance between the new experience
and all other experiences in the space. For efficiency, a list of near expe-
riences is kept for each experience and is updated as new experiences are
added.
A list of actions being executed (if any) at any timestep is kept and con-
sulted when determining what actions were executed immediately following
any given experience.
3 Related Work
There are many potential architectures that take history of action and in-
teraction into account. Top-down deliberative architectures such as ACT-R
include memory storage and retrieval and others such as Soar have been
extended to include episodic memory (Nuxoll and Laird, 2004). In Nux-
oll and Laird’s model the features of the episode are encoded and used
in retrieval by matching. This external representation of sensory input is
common. Connectionist systems that have memory include, for instance
Elman networks or recurrent neural networks. Rylatt and Czarnecki (2000)
showed that generally recurrent neural networks are not well suited to learn-
ing delayed response tasks. Additionally, recurrent networks are very hard
to design beyond a certain size and this requires that sensory input be en-
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coded and reduced in quantity. Approaches such as Echo State Networks
and Liquid State Machines attempt to address this limitation by training
only the output nodes of a network (Jaeger and Haas, 2004). The memory of
episodes appear only as weights and attractors of the system and so different
episodes cannot be compared. Other approaches include certain behaviour
oriented control systems combined with learning (Mataric´, 1992, Michaud
and Mataric´, 1998). Most behaviour based models do not include learning
from past experience, but of those that do our approach differs in that the
history is not specified in terms of the behaviour being selected (or indeed,
the action being selected), but in terms of the sensorimotor history.
Our work is related to reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998),
particularly those examples that use intrinsic motivation (for example (Barto
and S¸ims¸ek, 2005) or (Bonarini et al., 2006)). Our approach however uses
temporally extended experience rather than the instantaneous values of the
sensorimotor and internal variables (state). We would argue that this dis-
tinction is important as temporal structure is inherently captured in experi-
ences of different lengths. Moreover, we do not assume that the environment
can be modelled as a Markov Decision Process (this is particularly important
when there is an interaction partner) as is the case with most reinforcement
learning paradigms and in particular with approaches that do not use a
model, for example Q-learning. Furthermore, our approach does not require
a static state space to be circumscribed at the outset, but instead uses a
growing and changing space of experiences, where potentially in the course
of ontogeny the set and character of sensors, actuators, and embodiment
may change.
Related work in the multi-agent domain (Arai, Sycara, and Payne, 2000)
has agents in a grid world acquiring coordination strategies, and uses a fixed-
length episodic history expressly to counter the MDP assumption. However,
that model is also state based and so uses a profit-sharing mechanism to
assign credit to state-action pairs. Moreover, it does not compare episodes
of history with previous ones, nor locate them in a metric space.
Examples of a developmental approach used in robots include (Blank,
Kumar, Meeden, and Marshall, 2005) where a robot uses sub-goals to de-
velop smooth-wall following in an architecture that uses self-organizing maps
of visual and sonar data and (Oudeyer, Kaplan, Hafner, and Whyte, 2005)
where an Aibo robot discovers object affordances through an “adaptive cu-
riosity” driven developmental framework. Kaplan and Oudeyer (2006) also
propose mechanisms of drive and motivation based on “progress niches” that
allow an agent to maximize learning and developmental progress in a way
analogous to Vygotsky’s “zone of proximal development” (Vygotsky, 1978).
As interest in developmental robotics gains momentum, we will increas-
ingly see play-like scenarios used to scaffold early development of robots
(Oudeyer et al., 2005), to study human cognitive development (Kozima
et al., 2005) and just for entertainment (Brooks et al., 2004). Likewise,
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our use of an interaction game (peekaboo, see Section 5.1) played by human
children during early development was deliberately chosen to bring robotic
development closer to human development. See also (Dautenhahn et al.,
2002) for a representative review of robots socially interacting in play.
Recent research has used information methods in the analysis and con-
trol of (simulated and unsimulated) robot behaviour. Lungarella and Sporns
(2005) use informational measures (including mutual information and a re-
lated complexity measure) to quantify the degree of statistical structure in
sensorimotor spaces, and suggest that perceptually guided movement gen-
erates high degrees of regularity and correlation. Olsson, Nehaniv, and
Polani (2004) use an information distance measure to find structure in un-
interpreted sensorimotor data and also show that this is superior to other
measures such as the Hamming metric and the correlation coefficient (Ols-
son, Nehaniv, and Polani, 2006b). In particular they show that information
measures are a general method for quantifying functional relationships be-
tween sensorimotor variables, including non-linear relationships, which we
note may be important in systems situated in complex, real environments.
Having learnt how its sensorimotor system is structured through information
self-structuring during coordinated sensor-motor action, it is possible for a
robot to learn how its effectors can be used, for example, for simple motion
tracking (Olsson, Nehaniv, and Polani, 2005, 2006a). In earlier work Pierce
and Kuipers (1997) achieve learning of sensory maps and motor control laws
from uninterpreted sensors and effectors by use of statistical structure in the
data rather than informational methods.
4 Experimental Validation of Metric Space of Ex-
perience
In this first experiment the metric space of experience was tested in absence
of the action control loop (although experiments in the next section will
include this loop). For the metric space to be useful in an interaction history,
experiences that appear to be similar by a suitable subjective measure, must
also be close according to the measure of distance used to place experiences
in the interaction histories metric space. To test this, the history is used to
predict the future path of a ball based on recent sensory experience. If the
experiences are well matched then so will be the predicted path.
4.1 Validation Experiment: Experimental Setup
The robot was stationary in a “sitting” position, with the head pointed
forward. A pink ball was moved in the air in view of the robot’s head
camera at a distance of approximately 30cm. The path of the ball in each
trial included repeated vertical, horizontal and circular movements.
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The sensory data collected included the horizontal and vertical location
of the ball with respect to the video frame (calculated using simple colour
thresholding) along with the full sensorimotor input of Table 1. In addition
the ball position at the end of each episode of experience was stored along
with each experience. The predicted future position of the ball was then
taken from the positions stored with the experiences following the nearest
previous experience to the current one.
It is important to note that, the robot is not matching current ball
position with previous ball position, rather we use all sensory and motor
variables as information sources to detect similarity between experiences,
and then use the stored ball position to give the experimenter an indication
as to how well the experience was chosen. For verification purposes a path is
drawn on the display of the robot’s visual field during operation, indicating
the predicted future path.
The horizon length of the experiences was 40 timesteps or approximately
3400ms (a single timestep was approximately 85ms long). The data was
quantized into 5 bins in the probability distribution estimation algorithm.
The ball was moved such that the time for the ball to describe a circle (or
to move horizontally or vertically for a complete cycle) was 6-7 seconds,
Thus the horizon length was shorter than, but on the same scale as, a
single cycle of the repeated behaviour and the experiences would comprise
approximately a half of a cycle.
4.2 Validation Experiment: Results and Analysis
In Figure 2, we show a sequence of images from one trial with one image
shown per experience. The sequence lasts just over 4 seconds and consists of
approximately 50 timesteps (1 timestep ∼ 85ms) and 12 experiences (experi-
ence granularity G of 4 timesteps). There were 112 overlapping experiences
(about 39 seconds of activity) before the ones shown, during which the ball
was moved from left to right four times and in a circle once. Each image
shows the robot’s camera view during an experience with the predicted path
overlayed (at run-time). For clarity a single image from the sequence is re-
produced in Figure 3 with the position of the ball and the predicted path
highlighted.
Figure 2 about here
Figure 3 about here
In the sequence shown and others, the robot required very few examples
of a sequence (usually one) before the appropriately predictive experience
could be located. This demonstrates that the information distance measure
is capable of placing subjectively similar experiences (to an external ob-
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server) near to each other in the experience space (of the agent). However,
it was found that while the path of the ball could be predicted fairly well
early on in the sequence, later on, as the choice of experiences grew, the
candidate experience chosen was not always the most appropriate.
Occasionally subjectively inappropriate experiences were matched. As
an example, consider the seventh image in Figure 2, here the predicted path
inferred from the sequence of experiences following the candidate experience
corresponds to the half circle that the ball has just been through (rather than
the half-circle it is just about to go through, as in the other images). The
candidate experience chosen is informationally close to another experience
half a cycle back in time that may have been more appropriate. These two
possible experiences that could have been matched correspond to motions of
the ball from opposite sides of a circle. As the experience distance measure is
the sum of information distances between variables, then a symmetric error
such as this is likely, especially as phase-shifted periodic variables can have
a small or zero6 information distance. This particular test scenario presents
an unrealistic situation where the robot does not move, and we predict that
with embodied action, more information would be available with which to
distinguish experience.
5 Interaction Game Experiments
In this section we describe two experiments that use the experience metric
space in a robot that develops the capability to play a simple interaction
game. In the first a human partner engages in a “peekaboo” game with a
robot, and in the second the effect of the experience horizon length on the
ability of a robot to develop the capability to play the game is investigated.
In this section we describe and motivate the choice of the peekaboo
game as an interaction scenario for this study, followed by a description of
the experiments and results.
5.1 Peekaboo Early Interaction Game
The development of gestural communicative interaction skills is grounded in
the early interaction games that infants play. In the study of the ontogeny
of social interaction, gestural communication and turn-taking in artificial
agents, it is instructive to look at the kinds of interactions that children are
capable of in early development and how they learn to interact appropriately
with adults and other children. A well known interaction game is “peeka-
boo” where classically, the caregiver having established mutual engagement
through eye-contact, hides their face momentarily. On revealing their face
again the care-giver cries “peek-a-boo!’, “peep-bo!”, or something similar.
This usually results in pleasure for the infant which, in early development,
may be a result of the relief7 in the return of something considered lost (i.e.
17
the emotionally satisfying mutual contact), but later in development also
may be a result of the meeting of an expectation (i.e. the contact returning
as expected along with the pleasurable and familiar sound), and the recogni-
tion of the pleasurable game ensuing (Montague and Walker-Andrews, 2001,
Veatch, 1998).
Bruner and Sherwood Bruner and Sherwood (1975) studied peekaboo
from the viewpoint of play and learning of the rules and structures of games.
They also recognize that the game relies on (and is often contingent with)
developing a mastery of object permanence as well as being able to predict
the future location of the reappearing face. We suggest that the parts of the
game can be viewed as gestures in a non-verbal communicative interaction.
The hiding of the face is one such gesture, and the vocalization, and the
showing of pleasure (laughing) are others. In order for the interaction game
to proceed successfully, the gestures must be made by either party at the
times expected by the players, and that absence or mis-timing can result in
the game cycle being broken. Learning of the game is supported by further
gestures such as a rising expectant intonation of the voice during hiding, as
a reassurance or cue of the returning contact. Later in development the roles
of the game can become reversed with the child initiating the hiding, while
still obeying the established rules by, for instance, uttering the vocalization
on renewed contact.
In all this, the rhythm and timing of the interaction are crucial and,
Bruner and Sherwood suggest that the peekaboo game and other early in-
teraction games act as scaffolding on which later forms of interaction, partic-
ularly language and the required intricate timing details, can be built (Pea,
2004, pp 424-5).
In relation to the development of social cognition in infants, “peekaboo”
and other social interaction games, that are characterized by a building and
then releasing of tension in cyclic phases, are important as they are con-
sidered to contribute developmentally to infant understanding and practise
of social interaction. Peekaboo provides the caregiver with the scaffolding
upon which infants can co-regulate their emotional expressions with others,
build social expectations and establish primary intersubjectivity (Rochat,
Querido, and Striano, 1999).
Figure 4 about here
5.2 Interaction Experiment 1: Sensorimotor contingencies
in the interaction game - Peekaboo
The purpose of this experiment was to investigate whether an embodied
interaction history in a robot could be used for the robot to act appropriately
in an interaction that requires following a spatio-temporally structured set
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of “rules”, that when followed result in high value according to an internal
motivational system.
5.2.1 Interaction Experiment 1: Experimental Setup
The robot stays in a “sitting” position (see Figure 4) throughout the exper-
iment with the forelegs free to move, facing the human interaction partner
at a distance of 30-50cm. The actions which the robot can execute are listed
in Table 2. Each action takes two seconds or less and the re-centre head
action is duplicated to offset the two actions which take the head away from
the centre.
Table 2 about here
The human partner takes a passive role with the usual interaction feed-
back from the partner provided by an internally generated motivational
value in the robot. The action to “hide head with foreleg” means that the
robot covers its forward facing camera with one or other of its forelegs,
before uncovering it again a short time later.
In this experiment and the next, we define a peekaboo sequence to have
occurred when the robot having detected a face, through action looses de-
tection and returns to detect the face again, with this cycle repeating at
least once. This is marked, due to the nature of the motivational dynam-
ics (see Appendix A), with a high value for the motivational variable m.
The duration of the sequence is measured from the point of the first loss
of face detection through to the last point at which high motivation can be
sustained without a break in the sequence. The average cycle period is the
average duration of a single face loss/re-detection cycle within a peekaboo
sequence.
5.2.2 Interaction Experiment 1: Results and Analysis
Fifteen trials were conducted, each lasting between 3 and 5 minutes. The
results tend to show that the robot, after a period of random movement
does start to engage in repeated cycles of behaviour. In 10 of the trials the
robot engages in peekaboo as defined above. If the robot were not to take
action to block its own camera view, it would have long periods of detecting
a face which does not result in a high value for the motivational variable.
Instead the robot generates intermittency in detecting a face by executing
actions 1,2,6 or 7 in Table 2. The trace of the internal variables as well
as the actions executed from one short trial where peekaboo behaviour was
observed is shown in Figure 5. The sequence consists of 8 repeated cycles
of hiding interspersed with other actions, which importantly include actions
to re-centre the head.
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The trials also showed that it is easy for the robot to “get stuck” in areas
of the experience space especially if all other factors in the environment
remain unchanged. This occurs 4 times in these trials, usually with the
robot repeating an action such as waving.
Results also show that relatively few experiences are selected and thus
modified (with regard to their stored quality value) over time. In some of
the trials, particular experiences were selected multiple times, but this is not
always the case. In the trial of Figure 5, 34 choices of action were made, the
first 11 were random actions, and 13 of the remaining 23 actions were se-
lected from a total of 12 previous experiences (the other 10 being randomly
selected).
Figure 5 about here
5.3 Interaction Experiment 2: Investigation of the Effect of
Horizon Length
The purpose of this investigation was initially to evaluate whether the model
for development based on interaction history performed better than random
for the task of playing the game of peekaboo. Secondly, the hypothesis that
the horizon length of experience would affect the ability to acquire peekaboo
behaviour was tested by trying a number of different horizon lengths in
a controlled experiment. The hypothesis was that the horizon length of
experience needs to be of a similar scale to that of the interaction in question.
If it is too short, the experience does not carry enough information to make
useful comparisons to the history. If it is too long, then the interesting part
of the interaction becomes lost in the larger experience.
5.3.1 Interaction Experiment 2: Experimental Setup
Again the robot stays in a “sitting” position throughout the experiments but
facing instead a picture of a face (see Figure 4) at a fixed distance of 40cm.
A picture was used rather than an interaction partner in these particular
experiments to allow analysis of the robot’s interactions in isolation when
comparing horizon lengths, and for experimental repeatability.
We ran 6 trials of 2 minute duration for each horizon length of 8, 16, 32,
64 and 128 timesteps (0.96, 1.92, 3.84, 7.68 and 15.36 seconds respectively).
For comparison, a further 6 trials were run where the choice of action was
random and not based on history. In each of the trials the metric space
started unpopulated.
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5.3.2 Interaction Experiment 2: Results
Table 3 summarizes the results of 36 trial runs, while Figure 6 shows, for
selected trials, time-series graphs of the motivational variables coupled with
the actions taken. Peekaboo behaviour, as defined in Section 5.2.1 above,
was seen in 18 of the 36 runs. All but one of the horizon size 8 trials, and
four of horizon size 16, also showed peekaboo behaviour. The sequences
were mostly generated by repetitive actions for long durations. Figure 6A
(horizon size 8) shows the best example of this behaviour; the average cycle
period is approximately 42 timesteps or 5 seconds, and the sequence dura-
tion is around 640 timesteps (76 seconds). During this sequence the head
is hidden to the left and right and this is interspersed with head-centring
actions. Through all of these episodes periods of no action serve to alter
the timing of the cyclic periods. Although all of the trials using random
action selection showed some peekaboo behaviour, they were irregular both
in terms of cycle period length and in terms of the actions used to generate
the sequence (see Figure 6B for example).
Of the longer horizon length (32, 64 and 128) trials, three showed peek-
aboo behaviour using repeated actions (for example Figure 6D) . Three also
showed peekaboo using an action (waving) which would not normally cause
a break in face detection. In this particular circumstance, “rocking” of the
robot caused a break in face detection > 50ms and led to a peekaboo se-
quence (see Figure 6C for an example.)
5.3.3 Interaction Experiment 2: Analysis
All of the trial runs of random action selection resulted in some peekaboo
sequences, although with mixed, irregular actions. It is likely that this is
due to a motivational system that responds to a wide range of frequencies8
combined with a range of actions, four of which would result in some loss
of face detection. However, to see longer peekaboo sequences with regular
actions, some controlled behaviour must be selected and this is only seen in
the experience-driven trials. As a contrary example see Figure 6F where no
peekaboo-like dynamics are seen.
In some of the experience-driven trials repeated behaviour was seen that
could have resulted in high motivation if the head had been pointed forward.
Experience alone was not able to re-centre the head. On one occasion how-
ever, when the head was re-centred (randomly) then the experience space
allowed a resumption of the peekaboo sequence (see figure 6E). Thereafter,
a recentering action is selected along with hiding actions.
The best of the cyclic behaviour was seen in the experience-driven trials
of horizon size 8 and 16 timesteps (approx. 1 and 2 seconds respectively).
This result indicates that it may be necessary to have an appropriately sized
time-horizon, and this may be related to the length of single actions (about 2
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seconds), and thus the natural period9 of the cyclic behaviour. A reason why
this may be the case is that, to bootstrap the initial repetitive behaviour, it
is necessary to focus on an experience of one cycle length when there is only
a single (possibly randomly generated) example of the cycle in the agent’s
experience.
Table 3 about here
Figure 6 about here
6 Summary
We motivated and presented a definition of grounded sensorimotor interac-
tion histories for embodied organisms, and presented a control architecture
for an artificial organism using such a history. We also argue that a system
that connects action with dynamically constructed experiences can scaffold
ontogenetic development, given a sufficiently sophisticated system of goals
and motivations.
The system was implemented in an Aibo robot and results from a val-
idation experiment confirmed that a metric space of experience based on
information distance measures between time-extended episodes of sensori-
motor experience might be a suitable basis for extending the temporal hori-
zon using interaction histories in robots. Experiments using a robot playing
a simple interaction game using this architecture showed that it was able
to develop the capability to play the game based on its own experience and
an internal motivational system. Further results indicate that the horizon
length of experience plays an important role in the types of interaction that
can be engaged in. The experimental results support the hypothesis that
horizon length needs to be of a similar scale to that of the interaction in
question, and thus should be determined, at least in part, by the types of
interaction that will take place. The action selection architecture is however
still extremely limited and this combined with the short experiment lengths
and the over-sensitive motivational system suggests various directions for
improvement.
7 Future Work
An important direction that needs to be explored is the anticipation of
future action and expectation of future reward, although how far ahead in
the future may vary for the development of different skills and task abilities.
Currently experiences of the same length are being compared, however it is
also possible to have shorter term current experience being matched against
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parts of longer term episodic experience, and the current short experience
being assessed with an anticipated future value related to the best value
in the extended experience. We expect this approach to better balance
the requirement, as found above, to have horizons of appropriate size for
comparing experience successfully, while also taking into account temporally
extended aspects of interaction.
Further, given the apparent dependence on horizon length, it may be
necessary to operate on many different horizon lengths, and an adaptive,
variable experience length may help in then finding areas of high value for
the different kinds of interaction the robot will encounter. We suggest that
an approach to deciding on appropriate experience lengths will come from
the density of “interesting” features or events in the experience space, the
operational determination of which will take into account motivational dy-
namics, value of experience, and possibly rates of change of experience dis-
tances.
These particular experiments carried out so far do not have much non-
trivial interaction with either the environment or the partner’s side, and lack
features of more contingent social interaction. However, their purpose was
to establish the feasibility of using temporally extended experience based
interaction history architecture in adaptive behaviour in controlled studies.
The next steps must be to increase the social complexity of interactions
using the interaction history approach (most likely requiring a more sophis-
ticated motivational system) in less controlled scenarios, and to demonstrate
further capacity for scaffolding the ontogeny of interaction skills in the social
environment.
The current architecture is expensive in terms of both computer mem-
ory usage (increasing linearly with time) and computational complexity (in-
creasing quadratically with time), this cannot be sustainable in support for
long-term development. A solution may be to reduce the number of experi-
ences by “forgetting”, i.e. to remove “unused” experiences from the metric
space over time, or by “merging” similar experiences.10 If a constant number
of experiences were retained then both memory and computational complex-
ity would remain constant. Questions arise as to how many experiences to
retain, and which to remove. It would be essential however to retain a sense
of the structure of the experience space, and in particular the local density
of experience.
We expect the structure of the dynamically growing and changing expe-
rience space to reveal important information about familiarity of experience,
novelty of experience, areas of high and low reinforcement, areas of mastery
and zones where current development can proceed through learning. More-
over, from the structure of the experience space, natural representations
may emerge grounded in an agent’s sensorimotor history developed through
interaction, that are useful for ongoing developmental progress. Indeed, as
areas of familiarity, mastery and novelty are identified these may themselves
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provide a more general intrinsic motivational system that can drive devel-
opment.
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Notes
1This is true for the simpler Vehicles that do not have a memory.
2For instance, the bacteria Escherichia coli are known to have a certain minimal level
of embodiment (Quick et al., 1999) and ‘cognition’ (van Duijn et al., 2006), and are able,
without a nervous system, to exploit fairly simple sensor-motor coupling through limited
low-bandwidth channels to achieve reactive behaviour such as chemotaxis.
3The examples here are chosen from the separate but related fields of psychology,
cognitive science and artificial intelligence.
4The approach generalizes to continuous time and value sets with appropriate changes.
5In these experiments the radius is fixed, but we note that this could be adapted on-line.
6Variables that have a zero information distance are recoding equivalent and are not
necessarily identical (see (Crutchfield, 1990)).
7In the context of humour, peekaboo in its early stages is an example of relief laughter.
That is relief that the caregiver that is thought to have disappeared, actually has not
(Veatch, 1998).
8The motivational system tuned with the parameters given in Appendix A would result
in high values of the variable m after a few cycles where the face signal was lost for
anywhere between 50ms to 9.5 seconds. Thus it was inevitable that high motivational
value should be reached with even random actions.
9Note that the motivational system itself does not dictate this period as any cyclic
behaviour of period up to 19 seconds can result in high values of m.
10Alternatives are to store fewer experiences in the first place and to make fewer com-
parisons, maybe assimilating and deleting some of these experiences during a “sleeping”
phase.
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Appendix A: Motivational Dynamics
We present the dynamic system of coupled equations that describe the mo-
tivational system used to confer a quality measure to experience. This feed-
back from the environment was designed specifically for the requirements of
a peekaboo game, but could be generalized to other kinds of interaction.
To provide appropriate feedback, we require a high value for motiva-
tion following a period of peekaboo-like interaction. This is achieved by
the interplay between a signal originating in the environmental interaction
(perception of a face) and two internal variables.
Firstly, the agent possesses a binary meta-sensor f that is a result of
processing the visual sensors (image) to locate a generalized human face
shape in the image, if one exists. Face detection is implemented using In-
tel OpenCV HAAR Cascades (OpenCV, 2000). This is then smoothed to
remove short gaps (< 50ms).
Secondly, the desire to see a face is given by d (constrained in the range
[0,1]) and increases when there is no face seen at a rate determined by how
often a face has been seen recently (actually by feedback from m described
below). The desire decays otherwise. See equation 1.
Finally, the overall motivation m, also constrained in the range [0,1],
increases when f = 1. The rate of increase is determined by the desire to
see a face d. In the absence of desire d, when a face is seen m tends to a
constant value set by Cmax. When no face is seen, m decays at rate δ3. See
equation 2.
In the experiments described in the paper m is used as the quality value
for the experiences.
∆d =
{
α1m− δ1(1−m)d if f = 0,
−δ2d if f = 1.
(1)
∆m =
{
−δ3m if f = 0,
α2d+ β(Cmax −m) if f = 1.
d,m constrained such that d,m ∈ [0, 1]
(2)
The parameters of the dynamics equations are shown in Table 4 along
with the values used in the experiments. These values were chosen by trial
and error and we note that with these values the system is receptive to a
wide range of periods for peekaboo.
Table 4 about here
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Figure and Table Captions
Figure 1
Interaction history based control architecture. See text for description.
Figure 2
Validation Experiment. Series of 12 consecutive images from the Aibo cam-
era showing ball path prediction using a sensorimotor interaction history.
The robot does not move its head in this sequence. Images are sequential
left to right and top to bottom. The sequence lasts approx. 4.2 seconds
(49 timesteps or 12 experiences) and is taken after 38 seconds of activity.
The line shows the path prediction for 10 experiences ahead. The crosses
are from various methods for ball detection, only one of these was actually
used as sensory input. Horizon=40, Number of Bins=5, Experience granu-
larity=4 timesteps. One image shown per experience.
Figure 3
Single image from the Aibo camera taken during ball prediction experiment.
The predicted path has been highlighted with arrows, starting from the
position of the ball during the matched experience, and ending with the
position of the ball during the 10th experience after the matched one. The
lower cross-hair is detected ball position, the upper cross-hair is predicted
ball position.
Figure 4
Aibo playing “peekaboo” game. Left: Sony Aibo with human partner Right:
Using a static image. (Top: hiding head with front-leg, Bottom: Aibo’s
view, showing face detection.)
Figure 5
Time series of motor and sensor values showing engagement of robot in
peekaboo game. The bottom part of the graph shows when the face is seen
and the two internal variables are shown varying in response to this. The
actions executed are shown at the top of the trace.
Figure 6
Motivational dynamics and actions for selected 2 minute interaction se-
quences of different horizon lengths. Graphs show when face is seen (black
bars at bottom), the values of the key internal variables, m and d, and the
action taken at the top (Note: action 0 - “do nothing”, is not shown for clar-
ity). A: Peekaboo. Horizon size 8. Dynamics during an extended peekaboo
sequence. B: Random action selection resulting in high m and d. Although
the action selection is random, it is possible to get periods of high value. C:
Emergent behaviour resulting in high m and d. Horizon size 32. Dynamics
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generate high value when face is intermittently lost when the waving paw
returns to hit the hind knee and jogs the robot. D: Irregular response to
regular actions. Horizon size 64. The regular hiding of the head does not al-
ways result in high value, this maybe because the face is not detected during
the period that the head points forward. E: Repeated sequence. Horizon size
16. Sequence of peekaboo repeated after the head is recentred. F: Peekaboo
not inevitable. Horizon size 32. Here although the head is hidden twice, the
peekaboo dynamics are not inevitable and coordinated action is necessary
for continued high motivation.
Table 1
Sensors and Internal Variables.
Table 2
Actions.
Table 3
Experiment Summary. Duration and average cycle period in timesteps (ts)
of peekaboo sequences for each trial. Where peekaboo is achieved using a
waving instead of hiding action this is indicated as “waving”.
Table 4
Parameters of dynamic equations for motivational system.
34
Figures
Figure 1
35
Table 1
Type Examples Total
Exterioceptive IR-distance, Buttons 15
Visual Average colour val-
ues in a 3x3 grid over
image
9
Proprioceptive Joint positions, 18
Internal Face position, ball
position, desire to see
a face
10
36
Figure 2
37
Figure 3
38
Figure 4
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Table 2
Action Description
0 Do Nothing
1,2 Look right/left
3 Track ball with head
4,5 Re-centre head
6,7 Hide head with left/right foreleg
8,9 Wave with left/right foreleg
10 Wag tail
40
Figure 5
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Table 3
Run Random Horizon 8 Horizon 16 Horizon 32 Horizon 64 Horizon 128
length/period length/period length/period length/period length/period length/period
1 120ts / 40ts 180ts / 45ts 260ts / 40ts none 400ts / 57ts none
waving none
2 220ts / 55ts 150ts / 40ts none none none none
3 220ts / 45ts Fig 6A 140ts / 45ts Fig 6F none 100ts / 40ts
640ts / 42ts 200ts / 50ts none
4 200ts / 60ts 130ts / 45ts Fig 6E none none none
150ts / 70ts 260,240ts / 40ts
5 160ts / 50ts none 140ts / 35ts Fig 6C Fig 6D 120ts / 40ts
waving 540ts / 47ts 220,100 / 37ts
waving 100 / 40ts
6 Fig 6B 250ts / 42ts 120ts / 40ts 840ts / 47ts none none
80,140ts / 40ts waving
42
Table 4
Parameter Description Value
α1 rate of increase of d based on m 0.12
α2 rate of increase of m based on d 0.12
Cmax value that m tends to after long pe-
riods of f = 1
0.25
β rate that m tends to Cmax 0.02
δ1 rate of decay of d when no face is
seen
0.05
δ2 rate of decay of d when a face is seen 0.05
δ3 rate of decay of m when no face is
seen
0.05
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B: Random, run no. 6/6
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C: Horizon 32, run no. 5/6
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Experience based action selection, horizon size 64, (5 of 6)
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D: Horizon 64, run no. 5/6
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Experience based action selection, horizon size 16, (4 of 6)
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E: Horizon 16, run no. 4/6
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